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is,	 citizens	with	 extreme	 ideal	 points	 enter	 as	 candidates	more	 often	 than	moderate	 citizens.	
Second,	 less	 entry	 occurs,	 with	 even	 greater	 polarization,	 when	 voters	 have	 directional	
information	 about	 candidates’	 ideal	 points,	 using	 ideological	 party	 labels.	 Nonetheless,	 this	
directional	information	is	welfare	enhancing	because	the	inefficiency	from	greater	polarization	
is	 outweighed	by	 lower	 total	 entry	 costs	 and	better	 voter	 information.	 Third,	 entry	 rates	 are	
decreasing	in	group	size	and	the	entry	cost.	These	findings	are	all	implied	by	properties	of	the	
unique	symmetric	Bayesian	equilibrium	of	the	entry	game.	Quantitatively,	we	observe	too	little	























Here,	we	 examine	 these	 and	 related	 questions	 in	 a	 laboratory	 experiment	 by	 testing	 predictions	
derived	from	a	citizen‐candidate	entry	game	and	comparing	entry	behavior	across	several	different	





stage	where	each	citizen	decides	whether	 to	 throw	her	hat	 in	 the	ring.	Thus,	a	citizen’s	objective	
function	not	just	takes	into	account	the	benefits	of	holding	office	(“spoils	of	office”)	as	in	the	canonical	
model,	but	is	also	includes	the	cost	of	candidacy	and	the	indirect	benefit	of	reducing	the	possibility	
of	 less	 desired	 policies	 that	 would	 be	 implemented	 by	 other	 potential	 candidates.	 Because	 the	
citizens	 themselves	 decide	 on	 whether	 to	 run	 for	 office,	 both	 the	 number	 and	 the	 ideological	
composition	 of	 entering	 candidates	 are	 modeled	 as	 equilibrium	 outcomes.	 Crucially,	 their	 entry	
decisions	 are	asymmetric	 since	 citizens	with	 different	 policy	 preferences	will	 anticipate	 different	
benefits	 from	 policy	 implementation.	 Coordination	 problems	 are	 also	 present	 due	 to	 nontrivial	
strategic	uncertainties.	
In	the	standard	citizen	candidate	model,	all	citizens	are	endowed	with	complete	information	
about	 the	exact	 location	of	 all	others’	 ideal	points,	 and	hence	can	 infer	 the	exact	 location	of	each	
entering	 candidate.	 However,	 many	 empirical	 studies	 indicate	 that	 citizens	 tend	 to	 have	 limited	
knowledge	about	the	candidates’	exact	stances	on	policy	issues	(e.g.,	Campbell	et	al.	1960;	Palfrey	
and	 Poole	 1987).	We	 can	 think	 of	 various	 reasons	 why	 this	 is	 the	 case.	 For	 example,	 time	 and	






























second	 advantage	 of	 the	 incomplete	 information	 approach	 is	 that	 distributional	 predictions	 are	
qualitative	predictions	about	polarization	and	the	number	of	entrants	is	more	robust	to	a	wide	range	







This	 citizen‐candidate	 entry	 game	 with	 incomplete	 information	 yields	 sharp	 predictions	
about	 the	 distribution	 of	 the	 entrants’	 ideal	 points	 and	 the	 rate	 of	 entry.	 The	 key	 property	 of	
equilibrium	 is	political	polarization	 in	 the	sense	 that	 candidate	entry	 is	 from	the	extremes	of	 the	
policy	 space,	 contrary	 to	 usual	 centrist	 predictions	 of	 most	 models	 of	 political	 competition.	
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of	 interest	 such	 as	 the	 effects	 of	 electorate	 size,	 entry	 costs,	 benefits	 of	 holding	 office,	 and	 the	
distribution	of	ideal	points	on	entry	decisions	and	welfare.		
The	 intuition	 for	 why	 asymmetric	 information	 about	 citizen	 and	 candidate	 ideal	 points	
creates	political	polarization	can	be	explained	by	a	simple	example.	Suppose,	for	example,	the	policy	
space	is	ሾെ1,1ሿ	and	there	are	three	entrants	with	ideal	points	at	െ1,	0,	and	1,	respectively.	Then,	each	
candidate	has	a	one‐third	chance	of	winning	 the	election	(i.e.,	 they	each	vote	 for	 themselves	and,	
because	ideal	points	are	private	information,	each	non‐candidate	votes	randomly	for	one	of	them).	
With	identical	entry	costs	and	office‐holding	benefits,	they	only	differ	in	their	expected	policy	losses	









described	 above	 explores	 a	 polar	 case	 where	 citizens	 are	 completely	 uninformed	 about	 the	
candidates’	ideal	points,	except	for	the	inference	they	can	make	from	equilibrium	strategies,	to	wit,	
that	entry	comes	from	the	extremes.	It	is	interesting	to	explore	an	intermediate	case	of	incomplete	












a	 left	and	a	right	party	each	nominates	a	candidate	 from	the	pool	of	entrants	on	their	side	of	 the	
political	spectrum,	and	citizens	are	informed	about	each	nominee’s	party	affiliation.	This	provides	

















the	 same	 time	 do	 not	 reduce	welfare.	 The	 experiment	 also	 varies	 the	 environment	 in	 two	 other	





Looking	 ahead	 at	 the	 results	 briefly,	 in	 all	 treatments	 conducted	 in	 the	 experiment,	 we	
observe	the	key	polarization	effect:	the	probability	of	candidate	entry	is	increasing	in	the	distance	
between	 the	 median	 and	 a	 citizen’s	 ideal	 point.	 All	 of	 the	 model’s	 primary	 comparative	 static	
properties	of	entry	behavior	find	support	in	the	data.	And,	all	the	model’s	primary	comparative	static	
properties	about	welfare	are	also	supported.	Quantitatively,	relative	to	the	theoretical	equilibrium,	
we	 observe	 higher	 rates	 of	 entry	 for	 those	 treatments	where	 entry	 is	 predicted	 to	 be	 below	 50	









with	 complete	 information	 about	 candidate	 ideal	 points	 and	 vary	 the	 entry	 cost	 (Cadigan	 2005;	
Elbittar	 and	 Gomberg	 2009;	 Kamm	 2016).3	 Specifically,	 Cadigan	 (2005)	 uses	 a	 pen‐and‐paper	
experiment	with	electorates	of	 five	participants	who	have	distinct	 ideal	points	and	independently	
and	simultaneously	decide	on	whether	to	become	a	candidate.	The	electoral	composition	and	ideal	





worth	 mentioning.	 For	 example,	 their	 experiments	 are	 computerized	 and	 sincere	 votes	 are	
exclusively	 cast	 by	 an	 infinite	 number	 of	 non‐candidate	 robots	 with	 uniformly	 distributed	 ideal	
points	 over	 the	 continuum	ሾ0,100ሿ.	 Also,	 Elbittar	 and	 Gomberg	 use	 electorates	 of	 three	 or	 five	
participants	located	at	three	feasible	policies,	and	the	default	policy	if	none	of	them	enters	is	that	all	
must	 pay	 a	 large	 penalty.4	 We	 can	 summarize	 the	 three	 main	 common	 results	 of	 these	 citizen	
candidate	experiments	as	follows.	First,	there	are	more	candidates	on	average	when	the	entry	cost	is	
lower.	 Second,	 relative	 to	 Nash	 equilibrium	 (NE),	 there	 is	 over‐entry	 on	 average.	 Third,	 the	
qualitative	 predictions	 of	 entry	 are	 mostly	 supported	 by	 the	 data	 and	 some	 learning	 towards	
equilibrium	play	is	observed.	Looking	more	closely	at	their	results,	if	the	entry	cost	is	high	the	unique	
NE	is	that	only	the	median	citizen	enters	(Elbittar	and	Gomberg	have	two	equilibria,	each	where	one	





(1999)	 find	 under‐entry	 with	 asymmetric,	 randomly	 allocated	 rank‐based	 payoffs.	 Both	 studies	 contain	 features	 also	
present	in	our	work,	namely,	the	probability	of	getting	the	bonus	falls	in	the	number	of	entrants	and	expected	payoffs	are	


















the	 decision	 to	 run	 for	 office,	 our	 study	 is	 very	 different	 from	 these	 other	 citizen	 candidate	
experiments.	 In	 particular,	 we	 explore	 incomplete	 information	 about	 candidate	 ideal	 points,	 as	






is	electing	a	leader	to	implement	a	common	policy	ߛ	from	the	set	Γ ൌ ሼ1,2, … ,100ሽ.	Each	citizen	i	has	
a	privately	known	ideal	point	ݔ௜	that	is	an	iid	draw	from	a	uniform	distribution	also	over	Γ,	where	i’s	







receives	 an	office	holding	benefit	 of	ܾ ൒ 0.	Ties	 are	broken	 randomly.	 If	 no	 citizen	 enters,	 then	 a	
default	policy,	d,	takes	effect,	randomly	selecting	one	citizen	as	the	leader	who	receives	ܾ	but	does	




ߨ௜ሺݔ௜, ߛ, ݁௜, ݓ௜ሻ ൌ ܭ െ |ݔ௜ െ ߛ| െ ݁௜ܿ ൅ ݓ௜ܾ,																																												ሺ1ሻ	
where	K	is	a	constant,	݁௜ ൌ 1	if	she	entered	(݁௜ ൌ 0	otherwise)	and	ݓ௜ ൌ 1	if	she	is	the	leader	(ݓ௜ ൌ 0	
otherwise).	We	assume	citizen	݅	is	risk	neutral	and	maximizes	the	expected	value	of	ߨ௜.	
The	 perfect	 Bayesian	 equilibrium	 (PBE)	 of	 our	 citizen	 candidate	 game	 has	 the	 following	




0 ݂݅ ݔ௜ ∈ ሼුݔ௟ ൅ 1,… , ුݔ௥ െ 1ሽ
1 ݂݅ ݔ௜ ∈ ሼ1, … , ුݔ௟ሽ ∪ ሼුݔ௥, … ,100ሽ,
																																																ሺ2ሻ	
where	 ሺුݔ௟, ුݔ௥ሻ	 is	 an	 ideal	 point	 pair	 with	 1 ൑ ුݔ௟ ൑ 50	 and	 ුݔ௥ ൌ 101 െ ුݔ௟.6	 That	 is,	 the	 cutpoint	
strategy	݁̌௜	dictates	that	each	citizen	with	an	ideal	point	at	or	more	“extreme”	than	ුݔ௟	or	ුݔ௥	runs	for	
office,	 and	 each	 citizen	 with	 an	 ideal	 point	 more	 “moderate”	 than	ුݔ௟	 and	ුݔ௥	 does	 not	 run.	 The	
equilibrium	cutpoints	are	derived	by	comparing	a	citizen’s	expected	payoffs	 for	entering	and	not	
entering,	given	 that	other	 individuals	are	using	such	cutpoints	 (see	appendix	 for	details).	For	 the	
specification	assumed	here,	if	all	other	citizens	݆ ് ݅	are	using	cutpoint	strategy	ሺුݔ௟, ුݔ௥ሻ,	the	optimal	
entry	strategy	of	a	citizen	type	ݔ௜	is	to	enter	if	and	only	if	
ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ௡ିଵ ൬݊ െ 1݊ ൰ ൣܾ ൅ ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ݀ሻ|݀ ∈ ሼුݔ௟ ൅ 1, … , ුݔ௥ െ 1ሽሿ൧																																																																							ሺ3ሻ	
൅ ෍ ൬݊ െ 1݉ െ 1൰
௡
௠ୀଶ
݌௠ିଵሺ1 െ ݌ሻ௡ି௠ 1݉ ൣܾ ൅ ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ߛሻ|ߛ ∉ ሼුݔ௟ ൅ 1,… , ුݔ௥ െ 1ሽሿ൧ ൒ ܿ,	
where	the	left‐hand	side	(LHS)	gives	the	difference	between	the	expected	benefit	from	entering	and	
expected	benefit	from	not	entering,	excluding	the	cost	of	entry,	which	appears	on	the	right‐hand	side	
(RHS).	We	use	the	notation	݉ ≡ ∑ ݁௜௡௜ୀଵ 	to	denote	the	number	of	entrants	and	݌	to	denote	the	ex‐ante	
probability	that	a	randomly	selected	citizen	݆ ് ݅	enters.	If	nobody	enters,	then	the	default	policy	d	
takes	 effect,	where	 the	 expected	 loss	 from	 the	 absolute	distance	 in	 citizen	݅’s	 ideal	 point	 and	 the	
common	policy,	or	policy	loss,	is	given	by	
























citizen	݆ ് ݅	enters,	which	occurs	with	probability	ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ௡ିଵ.	The	intuition	is	that	if	only	citizen	݅	
enters,	then	she	can	ensure	leadership	by	entering	and	so	receives	ܾ	and	avoids	an	expected	loss	ሺ4ሻ	







which	is	computed	by	setting	ݔ௜ ൌ ුݔ௟	and	ුݔ௥ ൌ ුݔ௟	and	then	solving	(3)	at	equality.	
3.2.	Equilibrium	with	parties	
In	 elections	where	 the	 entry	 stage	 is	 organized	by	 ideological	 political	 parties,	 the	 two	decision‐
making	 stages	 have	 the	 following	 differences.	 First,	 all	 citizens	with	 an	 ideal	 point	 ݔ ∈ ሼ1, … ,50ሽ	
(ሼ51, … 100ሽ)	 automatically	 belong	 to	 the	Left	 (Right)	Party.	 If	 one	 or	more	 citizens	 from	a	party	















ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ௡ିଵ ൬݊ െ 1݊ ൰ ൣܾ ൅ ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ݀ሻ|݀ ∈ ሼුݔ௟ ൅ 1, … , ුݔ௥ െ 1ሽሿ൧	




௠ೝିଵ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ௡ି௠ೝ 1݉௥ ൣܾ ൅ ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ߛሻ|ߛ ∈ ሼුݔ௥, … ,100ሽሿ൧																								ሺ6ሻ	











ൈ ߩ௥ൣܾ ൅ ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ߛሻ|ߛ ∈ ሼ1, … , ුݔ௟ሽሿ൧	
















ൈ ߩ௥݉௥ ൣܾ ൅ ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ߛሻ|ߛ ∈ ሼුݔ௥, … ,100ሽሿ൧ ൒ ܿ.	
The	ex‐ante	probability	of	a	random	citizen	݆ ് ݅	entering	from	either	direction	is	denoted	by	݌,	and	
the	number	of	entrants	from	the	Left	and	Right	Party	is	denoted	by	݉௟	and	݉௥,	respectively,	with	݉ ≡
	݉௟ ൅ ݉௥.	Also	note	 that	 the	probability	a	random	citizen	enters	as	Left	Party	 candidate	(or	Right	
Party	candidate)	is	݌/2	since	the	distribution	of	ideal	points	is	uniform.	The	win	probability	of	the	
Right	Party	is	denoted	by	ߩ௥ ൌ ܪ ቂ௠ೝା௞௡ െ
ଵ
ଶቃ	with	ܪሾݖሿ ൌ ቐ
0 ݂݅ ݖ ൏ 0
1/2 ݂݅ ݖ ൌ 0
1 ݂݅ ݖ ൐ 0
,	and	the	expected	policy	
losses	in	the	respective	terms	are	given	by	





















avoidance,	1/݉௥ ൈ ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ߛሻ|ߛ ∈ ሼුݔ௥, … ,100ሽሿ	 because	 one	 of	 the	 ݉௥	 Right	 Party	 entrants	 is	
randomly	appointed	the	nominee	of	this	party.	The	third	term	on	ܮܪܵሺ6ሻ	gives	the	cases	where	at	
least	 one	 citizen	 ݆ ് ݅	 enters	 from	 the	Left	Party,	 but	 only	 citizen	 ݅	 enters	 from	 the	Right	Party,	
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so	݉௥ ൌ 1	and	she	secures	the	Right	Party	nomination.	Due	to	symmetry,	each	of	the	݊ െ ݉௟ െ 1	non‐
entrants	with	ideal	points	strictly	within	the	equilibrium	cutpoint	pair	prefers	the	Left	or	Right	Party	
nominee	with	probability	one‐half	for	each,	and	votes	accordingly	(as	accounted	for	by	the	index	݇	of	
the	 summation).	 Since	 citizen	 ݅	 is	 in	 the	Right	Party,	 her	 expected	 net	 gains	 from	 entry	 are	ߩ௥ܾ	
and	ߩ௥ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ߛሻ|ߛ ∈ ሼ1, … , ුݔ௟ሽሿ	 (i.e.,	 the	 policy	 loss	 avoided	 if	 the	 opponent	 nominee	 runs	
unopposed).	 Note	 that	ߩ௥	 declines	with	 each	Left	Party	 entrant,	who	 is	 expected	 to	 vote	 for	 this	
party’s	nominee.	The	fourth	term	of	the	LHS	of	ሺ6ሻ	represents	the	cases	where	at	least	one	citizen	݆ ്









	 In	 a	 222	 treatment	 design,	 we	 varied	 the	 “entry	 cost”	 (ܿ ൌ 10	 and	 20	 points)	 within	




at	 the	 start	 of	 each	period	 the	 subject	 pool	was	 randomly	divided	 into	 separate	 4‐	 or	 10‐person	
groups	that	did	not	interact	with	one	another	in	this	period,	and	each	participant	received	a	new	ideal	
point	and,	entirely	independently,	a	new	letter	ID	label.	They	were	informed	that	ideal	points	are	iid	














computer	 screen	 with	 a	 button	 labeled	 with	 her	 or	 his	 letter	 ID	 (a	 candidate’s	 own	 label	 was	
highlighted	in	red).	In	Party,	one	of	the	entrants	with	an	ideal	point	ݔ௜ ∈ ሼ1, … , 50ሽ	(ሼ51, … , 100ሽ)	was	





participant	 voted	 by	 clicking	 one	 of	 the	 candidate	 or	 nominee	 buttons	 and	 could	 not	 abstain.9	
Candidates	and	nominees	were	not	forced	to	vote	for	themselves.	The	candidate	or	nominee	with	the	
most	 votes	 was	 appointed	 the	 leader	 and	 received	 a	 bonus	 of	ܾ ൌ 5	 points,	 with	 ties	 broken	
randomly.	If	nobody	entered,	then	one	participant	was	randomly	and	equiprobably	appointed	the	
leader	 (and	 received	 ܾ ൌ 5	 points	 but	 did	 not	 pay	 c).	 Either	 way,	 the	 leader’s	 ideal	 point	 was	
implemented	as	the	policy	outcome.	After	the	election,	everyone	was	informed	about	the	number	of	
votes	 for	 each	 candidate	 or	 nominee,	 the	 leader’s	 letter	 ID,	 the	 policy	 outcome,	 the	 own	 period	
earnings,	and	reminded	whether	she	or	he	entered	and	was	a	leader	(and	thus	paid	c	and	received	
b).10	In	addition,	the	bottom	of	the	screen	contained	a	history	panel	where	at	any	time	participants	
could	view	 this	 information	 from	all	 previous	periods.	Participants	were	paid	 for	all	 2 ൈ 30 ൌ 60	
periods.	One	unpaid	practice	round	was	conducted	to	familiarize	them	with	the	user	interface.11	
Table	 1	 summarizes	 our	 experimental	 design	 (first	 six	 columns)	 and	 quantitative	 BNE	
predictions	 of	 the	 relevant	 observable	 variables	 (last	 five	 columns;	 denoted	 by	 an	 asterisk	 and	
subscript	 e	 for	 expected	 values).	 Each	 treatment	 ሺ݊, ܿ, ߠሻ	 has	 a	 unique	 symmetric	 cutpoint	 pair	
ሺුݔ௟∗, ුݔ௥∗ሻ	 that	 determines	 the	 individual	 entry	 probability,	݌∗	 (and	 thus	 the	 expected	 number	 of	
                                                            
8	In	the	experiment,	a	participant’s	ideal	point	was	termed	“your	best	outcome.”	In	Party,	we	labeled	left	and	right	as	“low	
number”	 and	 “high	 number”	 and	 citizens	 and	 nominees	 as	 “low/high	 number	 members“	 and	 “low/high	 number	















entrants,	݉௘∗),	 for	which	we	 also	 compute	 the	 ex‐ante	 expected	 individual	 payoff,	ߨ௘∗ ൌ ܭ െ 	ݒ௘∗ െ









[ුݔ௟∗, ුݔ௥∗] ݌∗	 ߨ௘∗	 ݒ௘∗	 ݌∗ܿ	
4	 10	 No	 36	(2)	 270 1,080 [42,	59] 0.84 66.98	 25.87	 8.40
4	 10	 Yes	 32	(2)	 240 960 [34,	67] 0.68 69.09	 25.36	 6.80
4	 20	 No	 36	(2)	 270 1,080 [20,	81] 0.40 64.59	 28.66	 8.00
4	 20	 Yes	 32	(2)	 240 960 [17,	84] 0.34 66.69	 27.76	 6.80
10	 10	 No	 40	(2)	 120 1,200 [21,	80] 0.42 59.71	 36.59	 4.20
10	 10	 Yes	 40	(2)	 120 1,200 [14,	87] 0.28 61.24	 36.46	 2.80
10	 20	 No	 40	(2)	 120 1,200 [10,	91] 0.20 57.59	 38.91	 4.00
10	 20	 Yes	 40	(2)	 120 1,200 [08,	93] 0.16 59.90	 37.40	 3.20
Note:	All	sessions	had	two	parts,	each	with	a	different	entry	cost	for	30	periods.	Each	treatment	used	a	leader	






The	next	 four	hypotheses	 specify	 the	primary	 comparative	 statics	derived	based	on	BNE,	




pairwise	comparisons	for	݌ሺ݊, ܿ, ߠሻ	(the	effect	is	the	same	for	݉௘ሺ݊, ܿ, ߠሻ):	
݌∗ሺ4,10,ࡺ࢕	ࡼࢇ࢚࢘࢟ሻ ൐	݌∗ሺ4,10, ࡼࢇ࢚࢘࢟ሻ;	
݌∗ሺ4,20,ࡺ࢕	ࡼࢇ࢚࢘࢟ሻ ൐	݌∗ሺ4,20, ࡼࢇ࢚࢘࢟ሻ;	
݌∗ሺ10,10,ࡺ࢕	ࡼࢇ࢚࢘࢟ሻ ൐ ݌∗ሺ10,10, ࡼࢇ࢚࢘࢟ሻ;	





݌∗ሺ૝, 10, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ݌∗ሺ૚૙, 10, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ;	
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݌∗ሺ૝, 20, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ݌∗ሺ૚૙, 20, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ;	
݌∗ሺ૝, 10, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ݌∗ሺ૚૙, 10, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ;	
݌∗ሺ૝, 20, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ݌∗ሺ૚૙, 20, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ.	
H4:	Cost	Effect.	 	Holding	 the	 group	 size	 and	party	mode	 constant,	 expected	 equilibrium	entry	 is	
decreasing	in	ܿ,	which	implies	four	hypotheses	in	terms	of	pairwise	comparisons	for	݌	(the	effect	is	
the	same	for		݉௘):	
݌∗ሺ4, ૚૙, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ݌∗ሺ4, ૛૙,ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ;	
݌∗ሺ10, ૚૙,ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ݌∗ሺ10, ૛૙,ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ;	
݌∗ሺ4, ૚૙, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ݌∗ሺ4, ૛૙, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ;	
݌∗ሺ10, ૚૙, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ݌∗ሺ10, ૛૙, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ.	






ߨ௘∗ሺ10,10,ࡺ࢕	ࡼࢇ࢚࢘࢟ሻ ൏ ߨ௘∗ሺ10,10, ࡼࢇ࢚࢘࢟ሻ;	
ߨ௘∗ሺ10,20,ࡺ࢕	ࡼࢇ࢚࢘࢟ሻ ൏ ߨ௘∗ሺ10,20, ࡼࢇ࢚࢘࢟ሻ.	
b) Group	size:		
ߨ௘∗	ሺ૝, 10, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ߨ௘∗	ሺ૚૙, 10, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ;	
ߨ௘∗	ሺ૝, 20, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ߨ௘∗	ሺ૚૙, 20, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ;	
ߨ௘∗	ሺ૝, 10, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ߨ௘∗	ሺ૚૙, 10, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ;	
ߨ௘∗	ሺ૝, 20, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ߨ௘∗	ሺ૚૙, 20, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ.	
c) Entry	cost:		
ߨ௘∗ሺ4, ૚૙,ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ߨ௘∗ሺ4, ૛૙, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ;	
ߨ௘∗ሺ10, ૚૙, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ߨ௘∗ሺ10, ૛૙,ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ;	
ߨ௘∗ሺ4, ૚૙, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ߨ௘∗ሺ4, ૛૙, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ;	
ߨ௘∗ሺ10, ૚૙, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ߨ௘∗ሺ10, ૛૙, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ.	
	 As	an	even	more	 stringent	 test	of	 the	equilibrium	model,	 the	BNE	of	 the	entry	game	also	
generates	 predictions	 about	 the	 complete	 order	 of	 qualitative	 predictions	 across	 all	 treatments,	
varying	all	the	treatment	variables	simultaneously.	
H6:	Entry	rate	ordering.	In	equilibrium,	the	ordering	of		݌	across	all	treatments	is:	
݌∗ሺ4,10, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ݌∗ሺ4,10, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ݌∗ሺ10,10, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ݌∗ሺ4,20,ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ݌∗ሺ4,20, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ
൐ ݌∗ሺ10,10, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ݌∗ሺ10,20, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ݌∗ሺ10,20, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ;	
H7:	Welfare	ordering.	In	equilibrium,	the	ordering	of		ߨ௘	across	all	treatments	is:	
ߨ௘∗ሺ4,10, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ߨ௘∗ሺ4,10, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ߨ௘∗ሺ4,20, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ߨ௘∗ሺ4,20, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ߨ௘∗ሺ10,10, ܲܽݎݐݕሻ


















QRE	 is	 a	 statistical	 generalization	 of	 NE	 that	 allows	 for	 decision‐making	 errors	 that	 are	
systematic	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 more	 lucrative	 decisions	 are	 made	 more	 often	 than	 less	 lucrative	
decisions.	 In	 the	 logit	 specification	 of	QRE,	 the	 parameter	ߣ ൒ 0	 represents	 the	 slope	 of	 the	 logit	
response	function,	with	lower	values	indicating	a	flatter	response	(“higher	error”)	and	higher	values	
indicate	a	steeper	response.	If	ߣ ൌ 0,	decisions	are	purely	random	so	each	citizen	type	ݔ ∈ ሼ1, … ,100ሽ	
enters	with	probability	one‐half.	The	rationality	level	strictly	rises	in	ߣ	until	ߣ ൎ ∞,	where	everyone	
is	virtually	 fully	 rational	 and	 follows	 the	BNE	cutpoint	 strategy.	 In	particular,	 each	citizen	 type	ݔ	
enters	with	probability	ݍሺݔሻ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ	strictly	in	between	zero	and	one,	which	depends	smoothly	on	
the	ideal	point	and	is	no	longer	a	cutpoint	strategy	that	dictates	a	“zero	or	one”	binary	choice	for	all	
ݔ.	 This	 leads	 to	 a	 set	 of	 equilibrium	conditions	 that	 are	 somewhat	different	 from	 ሺ2ሻ	 to	 ሺ9ሻ	 (see	



















complete	 order	 of	 qualitative	 predictions	 across	 all	 treatments	 is	 preserved	 when	 changing	 to	
empirical	 BNE	 and	 QRE.	 The	 observed	 rates	 of	 entry	 are	 averaged	 over	 all	 periods	 and	 QRE	
predictions	 use	ߣመ ൌ 0.083,	 the	 maximum	 likelihood	 estimate	 for	 all	 periods	 and	 treatments	
combined.	Furthermore,	the	scatter	plot	in	Figure	1	depicts	for	each	treatment	the	BNE	entry	rate	
݌௘௠௣∗ 	on	the	horizontal	axis	against	 the	average	observed	rate	݌௢௕௦	(markers)	and	QRE	rate	݌௘௠௣ఒ෡ 	
(markers	linked	by	dotted	line)	on	the	vertical	axis.	
Table	2:	Entry	‐	Predictions	and	data	
n	 c Party ݌௢௕௦	 ݌௘௠௣∗ 	 ݌௘௠௣ఒ෡ 	
4	 10 No .687	 .844	 .602	
4	 10 Yes .673	 .671	 .570	
4	 20 No .560	 .417	 .459	
4	 20 Yes .496	 .364	 .436	
10	 10 No .519	 .426	 .465	
10	 10 Yes .445	 .256	 .423	
10	 20 No .426	 .181	 .330	




find	 over‐entry	 for	 the	 treatments	 where	 ݌∗ ൏ 1/2	 and	 (weak)	 under‐entry	 for	 the	 treatments	
where	݌∗ ൐ 1/2.	This	 is	 not	 just	 a	 coincidence,	 but	 is	 a	 general	 property	of	 regular	QRE	 in	 these	

















QRE	 entry	 rate	 function	 (dashed	 lines)	 at	 the	 estimated	 value	 of	 ߣመ.15	With	 pure	 noise,	ߣ ൌ 0,	 the	
dashed	line	would	be	a	horizontal	through	݌ ൌ 0.5	and	in	BNE,	ߣ ൎ ∞,	it	would	be	a	step	function	
with	entry	rates	equal	to	one	for	all	ideal	points	at	or	more	extreme	than	the	two	cutpoints	(cross	
markers)	and	equal	to	zero	for	all	ideal	points	strictly	within	both	cutpoints.16	(see	appendix).	Not	




























measured	by	หݔ௜,௧ െ ݔ௠௘ௗ௜௔௡ห/49,	where	ݔ௠௘ௗ௜௔௡ ∈ ሼ50,51ሽ	depending	on	which	is	closer	to	ݔ௜,௧	(we	
chose	not	the	“true”	median	of	50.5	to	normalize	the	coefficient	by	dividing	by	the	maximum	distance	






Dependent	dummy	variable:	Entry	decision	(1	if	݁௜,௧ ൌ 1)	 	







































regression	uses	all	 the	data,	 the	same	results	occur	when	only	 the	respective	sessions	of	primary	














n	 c	 Party	 ߨത௢௕௦	 ߨത௘௠௣∗ 	 ߨത௘௠௣ఒ෡ 	
4	 10	 No 69.26 67.00 70.67
4	 10	 Yes 70.42 69.06 72.14
4	 20	 No 64.22 64.00 66.95
4	 20	 Yes 68.03 66.56 68.73
10	 10	 No 64.44 60.28 65.01
10	 10	 Yes 68.31 63.98 68.31
10	 20	 No 62.61 59.25 63.24





























































parameter	 configuration,	 it	 also	 generates	 hypotheses	 about	 comparisons	 across	 treatments	 that	





namely	݌௢௕௦ሺ4,20, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ ൐ ݌௢௕௦ሺ10,10, ܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕሻ,	for	which	the	predictions	݌௘௠௣∗ ൌ 0.417	and	
0.426	are	very	close	to	one	another.	This	provides	strong	evidence	in	favor	of	H6.	It	is	also	worth	
mentioning	that	while	the	BNE	and	QREሺߣመሻ	models	generate	the	same	treatment	ordering	of	entry	
rates,	 except	 for	 ሺܲܽݎݐݕ, ݊ ൌ 4, ܿ ൌ 10ሻ	 the	 latter	 predictions	 are	 always	 nearer	 to	 the	 data.	













The	 predicted	 voting	 behavior	 in	 BNE	 is	 quite	 simple:	 ሺ1ሻ	 each	 candidate	 in	No	Party	 and	 each	
nominee	in	Party	votes	for	herself;	ሺ2ሻ	with	two	nominees	each	non‐nominee	votes	for	the	one	whose	





















4	 10	 No .042	(.017) ‐	
4	 20	 No .026	(.015) ‐	
10	 10	 No .025	(.014) ‐	
10	 20	 No .008	(.004) ‐	
4	 10	 Yes .035	(.025) .052	(.020)	
4	 20	 Yes .007	(.007) .020	(.011)	
10	 10	 Yes .000	(.000) .057	(.018)	




with	 the	 number	 of	 such	 votes	 on	 the	 horizontal	 axis	 (from	 zero	 to	 the	 maximum	 observed	 of	
eighteen)	and	the	respective	fraction	of	individuals	on	the	vertical	axis.	The	figure	also	separates	out	
the	observations	 for	 independent	 candidates,	nominees,	 and	non‐nominees	as	 they	 face	different	









23	Compared	 to	nominees	 in	Party,	 there	 can	be	more	 than	 two	 contenders	 to	 choose	 from	by	 candidates	 in	No	Party,	















data	 (lines	 with	 spikes)	 and	 respective	 logarithmic	 trend	 lines	 for	 candidates	 and	 nominees	
combined	 and	 for	 non‐nominees	 (thick	 black	 and	 gray	 lines,	 respectively),	 and	 also	 separate	
logarithmic	trends	for	candidates	and	nominees	(dashed	black	lines)	and	non‐nominees	who	did	and	
did	not	enter	(dashed	gray	 lines).	As	can	be	seen,	unexpected	voting	of	candidates	and	nominees	
doesn’t	 depend	 on	 the	 own	 ideal	 point	 (Spearman’s	ߩ ൌ െ0.018	 for	 both	 roles	 combined	 and	
















െ0.352	 for	 entrants	 and	 non‐entrants;	݌ ൑ 0.012).	 In	 Party,	 note	 that	 anomalous	 voting	 of	 non‐
nominees	tends	to	be	smaller	when	they	entered	(݌ ൌ 0.006,	one‐tailed	Wilcoxon	signed‐ranks	test,	
25	individuals)	and	especially	high	for	ideal	points	within	about	ten	points	of	the	median.	Also,	the	
rates	 are	 always	 greater	 in	 the	 non‐nominee	 than	 nominee	 role	 (݌ ൌ 0.003,	 same	 test,	 26	
individuals).	Overall,	our	results	indicate	that	among	those	who	vote	unexpectedly,	candidates	and	
nominees	 make	 “plain”	 errors	 while	 for	 non‐nominees	 models	 that	 incorporate	 the	 pecuniary	
consequences	of	erroneous	voting	and	beliefs	about	nominee	ideal	points	seem	more	suitable.25	This	
also	makes	 sense,	 since	 the	expected	payoff‐maximizing	vote	 is	more	obvious	 for	 candidates	and	
















30	periods	(ߩ ൌ െ0.312	and	െ0.378;	݌ ൌ 0.093	and	0.003,	respectively)	but	not	the	first	30	periods	
(ߩ ൌ െ0.159, ݌ ൌ 0.402).	
7.2.	Individual	entry	behavior	
Here	 we	 present	 individual	 level	 data	 of	 entry	 behavior.	 Figure	 7	 depicts	 cumulative	
frequency	 distributions	 of	 actual	 average	 individual	 entry	 rates	 for	 ሺܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕ, ܿ ൌ 10, ݊ ൌ 4ሻ	










and	 20	 points	 on	 the	 horizontal	 and	 vertical	 axis,	 respectively.	 Each	 marker	 represents	 one	
                                                            





27	See	Figure	B3	in	Appendix	B.	The	cumulative	distributions	of	entry	rates	of	ሺܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕ, ܿ ൌ 10, ݊ ൌ 4ሻ	and	ሺܲܽݎݐݕ, ܿ ൌ




(a	 few	markers	are	somewhat	magnified	 in	proportion	to	 the	number	of	 individuals	at	 that	same	
coordinate).	As	expected,	independent	of	party	mode	and	group	size,	most	individuals	enter	more	
often	when	 it	 costs	 less	 (i.e.,	have	markers	below	 the	diagonal;	one‐tailed	Wilcoxon	signed	ranks	
tests,	݌ ൏ 0.001	for	each	party	mode	and	group	size	combination).	Specifically,	only	28	out	of	all	148	
participants	entered	more	often	with	a	larger	cost,	and	most	of	them	are	found	close	to	the	diagonal.	










݅	 and	 treatment	݄	 we	 estimate	 a	 cutpoint	 pair	 as	 follows,	 assuming	 that	 individuals	 use	 such	 a	
decision	rule.	For	each	participant	and	treatment,	we	have	ݐ ൌ 30	periods	or	observational	pairs	of	
an	ideal	point	and	entry	decision,	ሺݔ௜,௧, ݁௜,௧ሻ௛.	Fixing	a	cutpoint	pair	ሺුݔ௟, ුݔ௥ሻ௜,௛,	with	1 ൑ ුݔ௟ ൑ 50	and	




ሺ݅ሻ	ුݔ௟,௜ ൏ ݔ௜,௧ ൏ ුݔ௥,௜ 	and	݁௜,௧ ൌ 0,	or	












cumulative	 distributions	 of	 estimated	 individual	 cutpoint	 pairs	 for	 ሺܰ݋	ܲܽݎݐݕ, ܿ ൌ 10, ݊ ൌ 4ሻ	 and	
ሺܲܽݎݐݕ, ܿ ൌ 20, ݊ ൌ 10ሻ,	which	have	 the	most	moderate	 and	most	 extreme	BNE	 cutpoint	 pairs	 of	
ሾ42, 59ሿ	and	ሾ8, 93ሿ,	respectively.	Due	to	symmetry	we	only	show	the	left	cutpoints,	superimposing	















Table	7	 gives	 the	 fraction	of	 average	 individual	positive	differences	 in	 the	estimated	 “left	
cutpoint	with	ܿ ൌ 10	points	minus	left	cutpoint	with	ܿ ൌ 20	points.”	The	fraction	ranges	from	0.58	to	
0.78,	compared	to	1	in	BNE,	and	average	differences	range	from	4.27	to	8.64	(in	brackets).	
Table	7:	Fraction	(average)	of	positive	individual	cutpoint	differences	
	 Left	cutpoint		ܿ ൌ 10			left	cutpoint	ܿ ൌ 20
	 No	Party Party
݊ ൌ 4	 0.61	(8.64) 0.60	(6.66)











about	 the	 ideal	 points	 of	 citizens	 and	 candidates.	 Ideal	 points	 are	privately	 observed	 iid	 random	
draws	 from	 a	 uniform	distribution	 over	 the	 set	 of	 feasible	 common	policies.	Without	 ideological	
political	parties,	citizens	have	no	extra	information	about	the	ideal	points	of	independent	candidates	


















percent	 and	 (weak)	 under‐entry	 when	 it	 is	 greater	 than	 50	 percent.	 Because	 participants	 with	
moderate	ideal	points	sometimes	enter	and	win,	we	observe	less	political	polarization	and	thus	on	
average	a	smaller	total	policy	loss	and	greater	economic	welfare	than	predicted	(with	over‐entry,	the	
greater	 total	 expense	 is	 exceeded	 by	 the	 smaller	 policy	 loss).	 The	 primary	 comparative	 static	
predictions	of	logit	QRE	are	all	supported	in	the	data,	as	they	are	the	same	as	those	of	BNE,	but	in	
addition	QRE	 tracks	 the	 levels	 and	 patterns	 of	 entry	 and	welfare	much	 better.	 Third,	 ideological	
parties	lead	to	more	polarization,	but	at	the	same	time	alleviate	some	of	the	inefficiencies	caused	by	






to	 compare	 different	 voting	 systems	 (e.g.,	 Bol,	 Dellis,	 and	 Oak,	 forthcoming)	 and	 to	 study	more	
explicitly	the	formation	of	parties	and	how	they	select	their	nominees,	such	as	via	primaries	(e.g.,	
Hansen	2014).	We	hope	that	these	findings	may	inspire	further	theoretical	and	empirical	work	to	
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probability	function	of	ideal	points	ܨሺݔሻ ൌ ݔ/100,	ݔ ∈ ሼ1,2, … ,100ሽ	and	density	݂ሺݔሻ ൌ 1/100.	If	all	
citizens	݆ ് ݅	are	using	cutpoint	strategy	(cf.	ሺ2ሻ	in	the	main	text)	
݁̌௝ ൌ ቊ
0 ݂݅ ݔ௝ ∈ ሼුݔ௟ ൅ 1, … , ුݔ௥ െ 1ሽ
1 ݂݅ ݔ௝ ∈ ሼ1, … , ුݔ௟ሽ ∪ ሼුݔ௥, … ,100ሽ,
																																														 ሺܣ1ሻ	
then	the	expected	payoff	of	a	citizen	type	ݔ௜	for	entering	the	political	competition,	݁̌௜ ൌ 1,	is	given	by	
ܧሾߨ௜|ݔ௜, ݁̌௜ ൌ 1ሿ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ௡ିଵܾ																																																																																																																													ሺܣ2ሻ
൅ ෍ ൬݊ െ 1݉ െ 1൰
௡
௠ୀଶ
݌௠ିଵሺ1 െ ݌ሻ௡ି௠ ൥ܾ݉ െ
݉ െ 1
݉ ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ߛሻ|ߛ ∉ ሼුݔ௟ ൅ 1,… , ුݔ௥ െ 1ሽሿ൩ െ ܿ	
and	her	expected	payoff	from	not	entering,	݁̌௜ ൌ 0,	by	
ܧሾߨ௜|ݔ௜, ݁̌௜ ൌ 0ሿ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ௡ିଵ ൥ܾ݊ െ
݊ െ 1
݊ ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ݀ሻ|݀ ∈ ሼුݔ௟ ൅ 1,… , ුݔ௥ െ 1ሽሿ൩																																					ሺܣ3ሻ
െ ෍ ൬݊ െ 1݉ െ 1൰
௡
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a	 citizen	 type	ݔ௜	 in	 the	Right	Party	 for	entering	 the	political	 competition,	 ݁̌௜ ൌ 1,	 is	 given	by	 (and	
analogous	for	a	citizen	in	the	Left	Party)	
ܧሾߨ௜|ݔ௜, ݁̌௜ ൌ 1ሿ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ௡ିଵܾ																																																																																																																													ሺܣ4ሻ	




௠ೝିଵ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ௡ି௠ೝ ൥ ܾ݉௥ െ
݉௥ െ 1
݉௥ ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ߛሻ|ߛ ∈ ሼුݔ௥, … ,100ሽሿ൩																











ൈ ൣߩ௥ܾ െ ሺ1 െ ߩ௥ሻܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ߛሻ|ߛ ∈ ሼ1, … , ුݔ௟ሽሿ൧	
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ൈ ቎െሺ1 െ ߩ௥ሻܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ߛሻ|ߛ ∈ ሼ1, … , ුݔ௟ሽሿ ൅ ߩ௥ ൥ ܾ݉௥ െ
݉௥ െ 1
݉௥ ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ߛሻ|ߛ ∈ ሼුݔ௥, … ,100ሽሿ൩቏ െ ܿ	
and	her	expected	payoff	from	not	entering,	݁̌௜ ൌ 0,	is	given	by	
ܧሾߨ௜|ݔ௜, ݁̌௜ ൌ 0ሿ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ௡ିଵ ൥ܾ݊ െ
݊ െ 1
݊ ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ݀ሻ|݀ ∈ ሼුݔ௟ ൅ 1,… , ුݔ௥ െ 1ሽሿ൩																													ሺܣ5ሻ	
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Without	parties,	 the	ex‐ante	(i.e.,	before	citizen	 ideal	points	are	randomly	drawn),	 the	average	or	
expected	individual	payoff	ߨ௘ ൌ భ೙∑ ߨ௘,௜௡௜ୀଵ 	is	given	by	
ߨ௘,ே௢	௉௔௥௧௬ ൌ ܭ െ ݌ܿ ൅ ܾ݊ െ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ
௡ ݊ െ 1
































ߨ௘,௉௔௥௧௬ ൌ ܭ െ ݏܿ ൅ ܾ݊ െ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ
௡ ∙ ݊ െ 1݊ ෍ 	 ෍
|ݔ െ ߛ|












௠೗ ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ௡ି௠೗ ∙ 1݊ ቎ሺ݊ െ ݉௟ሻ ෍ 	෍
|ݔ െ ߛ|




















































































where	ߩ௟ ൌ ܪ ቂ௠೗ା௞௡ െ
ଵ
ଶቃ	is	the	Left	Party’s	probability	of	winning	and	ܪሾݖሿ ൌ ቐ
0 ݂݅ ݖ ൏ 0
1/2 ݂݅ ݖ ൌ 0
1 ݂݅ ݖ ൐ 0
.	
QRE	entry	conditions	
Here,	 we	 derive	 the	 logit	 QRE	 conditions	 of	 entry	 probabilities,	 allowing	 for	 erroneous	 binary	






1 ൅ ݁ିఒ௏ሺ௫೔,௤ሬԦೣሻ .																																																																		ሺܣ8ሻ	
The	LHS	gives	her	entry	probability	ݍ௫೔	and	on	RHS	ݍԦ௫	denotes	the	vector	of	entry	probabilities	of	all	
feasible	types	ݔ ∈ ሼ1,2, … ,100ሽ	that	every	other	citizen	݆ ് ݅	may	possess.	Since	ideal	points	are	iid	










ܸሺݔ௜, ݍԦ௫ሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݍሻ௡ିଵ ൬݊ െ 1݊ ൰ ൣܾ ൅ ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ݀ሻ|݀ ∈ሼ1,… ,100ሽሿ൧																																																												ሺܣ10ሻ	
൅ ෍ ൬݊ െ 1݉ െ 1൰
௡
௠ୀଶ
ݍ௠ିଵሺ1 െ ݍሻ௡ି௠ 1݉ ൣܾ ൅ ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ߛሻ|ߛ ∈ ሼ1, … ,100ሽሿ൧ െ ܿ,																						
with	















Then,	 for	 a	 given	 ߣ	 the	 one‐hundred	 equilibrium	 conditions	 of	 the	 form	 ሺܣ8ሻ	 are	
simultaneously	solved	for	ݔ ൌ 1,… ,100		to	determine	the	QRE	vector	of	entry	probabilities,	ݍԦ௫ఒ.	
Next,	with	parties	we	need	to	distinguish	between	entrants	 from	the	Left	 and	Right	Party,	












ݍ ൌ ݍ௟ ൅ ݍ௥.																																																																									ሺܣ15ሻ	
	 The	RHS	of	ሺܣ8ሻ	contains	citizen	݅’s	expected	net	payoff	 from	entering	(cf.	ሺ6ሻ	 in	the	main	
text),	which	for	a	right	type	ݔ ∈ ሼ51,… ,100ሽ		is	given	by	(and	similar	for	a	left	type	ݔ ∈ ሼ1, … ,50ሽ)	
ܸሺݔ௜, ݍԦ௫ሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݍሻ௡ିଵ ൬݊ െ 1݊ ൰ ൣܾ ൅ ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ݀ሻ|݀ ∈ ሼ1,… ,100ሽሿ൧ ൅	
൅ ෍ ൬ ݊ െ 1݉௥ െ 1൰
௡
௠ೝୀଶ
ሺݍ௥ሻ௠ೝିଵሺ1 െ ݍሻ௡ି௠ೝ ∙ 1݉௥ ൣܾ ൅ ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ߛሻ|ߛ ∈ ሼ51, … ,100ሽሿ൧																											ሺܣ16ሻ	
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ൈ ߩ௥ൣܾ ൅ ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ߛሻ|ߛ ∈ሼ1, … ,50ሽሿ൧	













ൈ ߩ௥݉௥ ൣܾ ൅ ܧሾݒሺݔ௜, ߛሻ|ߛ ∈ ሼ51, … ,100ሽሿ൧ െ ܿ,	
with	




















ߩ௥ ൌ ܪ ቂ௠ೝା௞௡ െ
ଵ
ଶቃ	gives	the	win	probability	of	the	Right	Party	with	ܪሾݖሿ ൌ ቐ
0 ݂݅ ݖ ൏ 0
1/2 ݂݅ ݖ ൌ 0
1 ݂݅ ݖ ൐ 0
.	Then,	
for	a	given	ߣ	 the	one‐hundred	equilibrium	conditions	of	 the	 form	ሺܣ8ሻ	are	simultaneously	solved	








n	 c	 Party ݌௢௕௦	 		݌∗	(݌௘௠௣∗ ) ݌ఒ෡	(݌௘௠௣ఒ෡ )	
4	 10	 No .687 .840	(.844) .603	(.602)	
4	 10	 Yes .673 .680	(.671) .569	(.570)	
4	 20	 No .560 .400	(.417) .457	(.459)	
4	 20	 Yes .496 .340	(.364) .434	(.436)	
10	 10	 No .519 .420	(.426) .465	(.465)	
10	 10	 Yes .445 .280	(.256) .424	(.423)	
10	 20	 No .426 .200	(.181) .331	(.330)	





n	 c	 Party	 ߨത௢௕௦	 				ߨ௘∗				(ߨ௘௠௣∗ )	 						ߨ௘ఒ෡				(ߨ௘௠௣ఒ෡ )	
4	 10	 No	 69.26 66.98 (67.00) 69.91	(70.67)	
4	 10	 Yes	 70.42 69.09	(69.06) 71.96	(72.14)	
4	 20	 No	 64.22 64.59 (64.00) 66.65 (66.95)	
4	 20	 Yes	 68.03 66.69	(66.56) 68.41	(68.73)	
10	 10	 No	 64.44 59.71 (60.28) 65.45	(65.01)	
10	 10	 Yes	 68.31 61.24	(63.98) 68.36 (68.31)	
10	 20	 No	 62.61 57.59 (59.25) 63.20	(63.24)	




Treatment	 Payoffs	 Policy	losses	 Entry	expenses	 Bonus	
n	 c	 Party	 ߨത௢௕௦	 ߨത௘௠௣∗ 	 ߨത௘௠௣ఒ෡ 	 ̅ݒ௢௕௦	 ̅ݒ௘௠௣∗ 	 ̅ݒ௘௠௣ఒ෡ 	 ݌௢௕௦ܿ ݌௘௠௣∗ ܿ ݌௘௠௣ఒ෡ ܿ	 ܾ/݊
4	 10	 No	 69.26	 67.00	 70.67 25.12 25.81 24.55 6.87 8.44	 6.02 1.25
4	 10	 Yes	 70.42	 69.06	 72.14 24.10 25.48 23.41 6.73 6.71	 5.70 1.25
4	 20	 No	 64.22	 64.00	 66.95 25.83 28.91 25.12 11.20 8.33	 9.18 1.25
4	 20	 Yes	 68.03	 66.56	 68.73 23.30 27.42 23.81 9.92 7.27	 8.71 1.25
10	 10	 No	 64.44	 60.28	 65.01 30.87 35.96 30.84 5.19			 4.26	 4.65 0.50
10	 10	 Yes	 68.31	 63.98	 68.31 27.74 33.96 27.96 4.45 2.56	 4.23 0.50
10	 20	 No	 62.61	 59.25	 63.24 29.38 37.63 30.66 8.52 3.62	 6.60 0.50






Leader	 n	 c	 Party	 ߨത௢௕௦	 ̅ݒ௢௕௦	 ݌௢௕௦ܿ	 ܾ	
No	
4	 10	 No 60.65	 33.49 5.86	 ‐	
4	 10	 Yes 62.23	 32.13 5.64	 ‐	
4	 20	 No 57.19	 34.44 8.37	 ‐	
4	 20	 Yes 61.88	 31.07 7.06	 ‐	
10	 10	 No 61.04	 34.30 4.66			 ‐	
10	 10	 Yes 65.34	 30.82 3.84	 ‐	
10	 20	 No 60.12	 32.64 7.24	 ‐	
10	 20	 Yes 62.00	 33.04 4.96	 ‐	
Yes	
4	 10	 No 95.11	 0 9.89	 5	
4	 10	 Yes 95.00	 0 10.00	 5	
4	 20	 No 85.30	 0 19.70	 5	
4	 20	 Yes 86.50	 0 18.50	 5	
10	 10	 No 95.00	 0 10.00			 5	
10	 10	 Yes 95.08	 0 9.92	 5	
10	 20	 No 85.00	 0 20.00	 5	
10	 20	 Yes 85.50	 0 19.50	 5	













































































to	 100,	 with	 an	 equal	 chance	 of	 being	 any	 of	 those	 integers.	 Importantly,	 best	 outcomes	 are	
reassigned	independently	in	each	round,	so	your	own	best	outcome	will	typically	vary	from	round	to	



























































ൌ 100 െ |ݕ݋ݑݎ	ܾ݁ݏݐ	݋ݑݐܿ݋݉݁ െ ݃ݎ݋ݑ݌	݋ݑݐܿ݋݉݁| െ 10.	
Example:	Your	own	best	outcome	is	60,	and	the	group	outcome	is	91,	then	your	round	earnings	are	




ൌ 100 െ |ݕ݋ݑݎ	ܾ݁ݏݐ	݋ݑݐ݋݉݁ െ ݃ݎ݋ݑ݌	݋ݑݐܿ݋݉݁| ൅ 5 െ 10	





ൌ 100 െ |ݕ݋ݑݎ	ܾ݁ݏݐ	݋ݑݐܿ݋݉݁ െ ݃ݎ݋ݑ݌	݋ݑݐܿ݋݉݁|.	
Example:	Your	own	best	outcome	is	60,	and	the	group	outcome	is	15,	then	your	round	earnings	are	




ൌ 100 െ |ݕ݋ݑݎ	ܾ݁ݏݐ	݋ݑݐ݋݉݁ െ ݃ݎ݋ݑ݌	݋ݑݐܿ݋݉݁| ൅ 5	


























Decision	screens	(No	Party,	݊ ൌ 10,	ܿ ൌ 10	points)	
Entry	decision	
	
Voting	decision	
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Election	results	
		
